Quantifying Information Leakage in RFID Systems by Huang, Xu
Quantifying Information Leakage in RFID Systems
Xu Huang
School ofInformation Sciences and Engineering
University ofCanberra
ACT2601, Canberra, Australia
Xu.Huang(@canberra.edu.au
Abstract - Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems
provide large scale, automated tracking solutions and superior
reliability over existing tracking systems as well as the possibility
of authentication, but also pose a threat to customer privacy,
which already drew great attentions from researchers in this
field. In this paper the quantifying information leakage in RFID
systems will be first investigated via the Shannon's information
theory, and the analysis results are also extended from binary to
r-ary coding systems. The secondary contribution of this paper is
that based on the first part discussion a modified "hash-chain"
protocol is presented that decreasing the heavy burden on back-
end database to authenticate tags, which the normal hash-chain
protocol computes hash function many times on every tag.
Index Terms - RFID, information leakage, cryptographic
approach, hash function.
I. Introduction
Recently radio frequency identification (RFID) attracts great
attentions as an alternative to the bar code in the distribution
industry, supply chain and banking sector. RFID systems also
increasingly are used in control and tracking, medical monitor
systems, and other daily managements and businesses. This is
because RFID system that has advantages of contact-less type
and can hold more data than the bar code. Nevertheless, an
automatic identification technology using RFID can suffer
from the privacy problems such as tracking without user's
recognition [1-2].
The ubiquity of RFID tags also poses many security
threats, such as denial of service, tag impersonation, malicious
traceability, and information leakage. In particular in
everyday life, people are prone to carrying various objects
around with them. Some of them are quite personal, which
contains the user's privacy. For example, expensive products,
cash, medicine information, reading materials, even books that
may reflect personal consciousness and avocation. Also there
is a function of a RFID system titled as "behavioural tracking
and identification", namely an adversary can link the tags with
that purchased items and trace the people who have made the
purchasing. Avoiding eavesdropping can be done by
establishing a secure channel between the tag and the reader.
This requires the establishment of a session secret key, which
is not always an easy task considering the very limited
devices' capacities. The difficulty is supported by the fact that
tags and reader do not share a master key in most of the
application. As many papers showed that the problem of
secure pairing of wireless devices has been tackled by several
researchers.
In the [3], the tags that auto-ID centre supports have the
following property: each tag has a unique 8-bit password and
upon receiving the password, the tag erases itself. That is the
fact that the tags in the RFID system suicide preventing any
subsequent useful services. Since tags kill command feature
and the benefits of RFID are dimmed. The system needs a
conscious operating as there is no return back processing.
There is a scheme called "hash lock scheme" as described
in [4-7]. The scheme is low-cost because it requires only a
hash function. Each tag verifies the reader as follows. The
reader has key k for each tag, and each tag holds the result ID.
However, ever ID is fixed. So attacker can track the tags and
the protocol is vulnerable to reply an attack. Also when
attacker disguises the right reader and receives the ID from the
tag then disguises the right tag and gets the key from the right
reader sending this ID.
Papers [7-8] made an extension of the hash lock type
scheme to the so-called "randomized hash lock scheme" that
requires the tag to have a hash function and a pseudo-random
generator. Each tag calculates the hash function based on the
input from pseudo-random generated, r and id, i.e. c =
hash(iWr). The tag then sends c and r to the reader. The
reader sends the data to the back-end database. Since idk is
sent to the tag through the insecure channel, the tag can be
tracked.
There is a scheme titled as "anonymous ID" showed in
[9], where the output of a tag is an anonymous ID. The
adversary can never know the real ID of the tag because it
uses public-key encryption schemes or symmetric-encryption
schemes or random value linked to tag's ID on external
computation units. However an authentication or secure
channel must be established between the reader and the back-
end database. Also the anonymous ID is fixed, tracking
becomes possible.
The "external re-encryption protocol" [10] seems
theoretically more secure than some security protocols
because it also uses a public key cryptography technique to
protect the tag's ID. It is noted that for the external devices
such as a reader to perform encryption and decryption one
hand the public key cryptography needs much computation
and on the other hand the tags can't compute the public key
encryption and decryption. The encrypted tag's ID is fixed in
this protocol it has a problem that the tag's data is often
rewrite to protect the secret information. Also this protocol is
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not suitable for ubiquitous environment as the protocol needs
the external devices and the user's action for re-encryption.
Juels, discussed security and privacy [20] and Avoine
presented an interesting discussion in security and privacy in
RFID systems [21].
There are other approaches [11-15], for example, "noisy
tags" [ 11] where noisy tags are owned by the reader's
manager and set out within the reader's field. They are
regular RFID tags generate noise on the public channel
between the reader and the queried tag, such that an
eavesdropper cannot differentiate the messages sent by the
queried tag from the ones sent by the noisy tag. Therefore,
she will be unable to identify the secret bits that are sent to the
reader. The complexes would make it hard to be real life
application.
In this paper, we first investigated, via the Shannon's
information theory, an analysis result and then it is also
extended from a binary system to r-ary coding system. This
paper is to present a modified titled "hash-chain" protocol that
is decreasing the heavy burden on back-end database to
authenticate tags, which saves time in comparison with the
other hash-chain protocols.
The rest sections will be as follows, in section 2 the
quantifying information leakage in RFID systems will be
presented via the Shannon's information theory. It will show
that Shannon's equations can be extended what we need for
the RFID systems. Then we use the Shannon's information
theory to explain the quantifying information leakage in this
section.
A conclusion will be obtained based on the discussion of
Shannon's information theory that when the communication
channel is built with pure Gaussian noisy the noise entropy.
In section 3, a modified hash-chain protocol is established
based on the cryptographic approach, where the hash-chain
protocol will save a heavy burden of calculations on back-end
database to authenticate tags due the fact that instead of using
bit transiting a coding system is used.
We shall show the conclusion of this paper in section 4.
n
H(m) = IP1I bits
i=l
(2)
If the channel is noiseless, then the reception of some
symbol yj uniquely determines the message transmitted.
Because of noise, there is a certain amount of uncertainty
regarding the transmitted symbol when yj is received. If
P(x,lyj) represents the conditional probabilities that xi was
transmitted when yj is received, then there is an uncertainty of
log2[10P(x,jyj)] about xi when yi is received. When this
uncertainty is averaged over all xi and yj, we obtain H(xLy),
which is the average uncertainty about a transmitted symbol
when a symbol is received. Therefore, we have
H(x y) = P(Xi,Yj)1og2 1
ij ~~P(xi y1) (3)
Hence, if the channel were noiseless, the uncertainty would
be zero. Obviously, this uncertainly, H(xLy), is caused by
channel noise, by which we lose an average of H(xly) bits of
information per symbol. Therefore, in the transaction the
amount of information the receiver receives is, on the average,
I(x;y) bits per received symbol, we have
I(x; y) = H(x) - H(x y) (4)
Here, I(x;y) is the mutual information of x and y. From the
equations (3), for the continuous channel we have [18]:
H(y x) = 1x, y) log, dxdyH(y x)-001
~ Ap(y x) (5)
Ifp,1(.) represents the PDF of noise sample n, then
p(y x) = Pn (y-x) (6)
Then, we have
II. Quantifying information leakage
In order to compare our final results with that obtained from
similar methods we shall follow the terminology terms used in
those papers, e.g. [17]. Let's consider a memoriless source m
emitting messages m1, M2, ..., mn with probabilities P1, P2, ....
Pn1 respectively (P1 +... + Pn ) =1. Here, a memoriless source
implies that each message emitted is independent of the
previous message(s). By this definition we have the
information content of message m, is Ii, given by the following
equation:
I = log2 1
pi
(1)
The average information per message of a source in m is
defined as its entropy, denoted by H(m). Therefore, we have
1P(Y x)og2l (y, ) dy
g P(~~Y x)
1(Y-x)log2 dyPn (y x)
Letting y-x = z and note the right-hand side is the entropy
H(n) we have
H(y x) = H(n) p(x)dx = H(n) (7)
Therefore, we have:
I(x;y) = H(y) - H(n) (8)
It is easy to obtain the maximum entropy for given mean
square value of x via "undetermined multipliers" the
maximum entropy, (or maximum uncertainty) is when the
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distribution of x is Gaussian distribution. Hence, we have the
case that if we submit Gaussian distribution entropy we have
1 2 1 ITH(n) -log2 22te& = log2 17.1& (9)
2 2
Now let's have a closer look at equation (7) in a RFID
system it represents the average information to link one output
from an RFID device with the output history by the attacker.
In fact it is easily to find that this term is the exactly defined
"measure unlinkability" in [16]. In fact we see the that from
Shannon's information theory, H(n) is the entropy of noise, or
maximum noise between information source and the
information receiver. Hence, the bigger of H(n) is, the more
unlinkability will be and the information will be more safe.
Therefore, we can use the H(n) as a parameter, called the
"unlinkability", to measure the safety in a RFID detecting
system. It is obvious that if H(n) = 0 there is no noise at all
hence the "unlinkability" is minimum and the information will
be totally obtained by the attacker.
It is noted that if the RFID communication channel is
wider, therefore the & of the Gaussian will be bigger and
leads the noise entropy larger to make the information safer as
shown by equation (9).
It is important to note that so far what we discussed being in
binary coding system. If we use r-ary system, what will
happen? In fact, it would be easily to be extended. Because
each r-ray digit can assume r values, k r-ray digits can form a
maximum of rk distinct code words. So that to encode each of
the n equiprobable messages, we need a minimum of k = log,n
r-ary digits. Hence the information I per message is
I = og r-ary units (10)
From equation (1) and (10) we have
1 r-ary unit =log2r bits (11)
Now we can use equation (11) to extended binary cases
described above to r-ary systems.
III. A modified hash-chain protocol
In order to check the leakage in RFID cryptographic systems
discussed above we are now presenting a modified hash-chain
protocol as a case study in this section.
It was presented that the security risks of low-cost RFID
tags, the researchers have made a lot of discussions such as
Weis et al. [4], these papers presented privacy and security
risks and how they improved to the setting of low-cost RFID
devices in various ways.
In fact, we may use the definition of privacy in [22],
where it is the degree to which two authentication sessions of
the same tag are not linkable. An authentication session is
defined as the interaction between a reader (legitimate or
rogue) and a tag at the protocol level. Sessions are defined as
"unlikable" if an attacker cannot discover whether two
responses originated from the same tag with a probability
better than random guessing. The highest degree of
unlinkability exits if any pair of tags is indistinguishable. It is
normally to measure privacy as the degree to which a member
of the group is indistinguishable from other elements of the
group.
Let's have a closer look at a processing that "how to lock
tag". Accepting the fact that resource limitations of low-cost
tags, people normally offer a simple security scheme based on
one-way hash function. As example, to lock a tag, a tag
owner stores the hash of a random key as the tag's ID, i.e. ID
e- hash(key). This may occur either over the RF channel or a
physical contact channel for added security. After locking a
tag, the owner stores both the key and an ID in a back-end
database. Upon receipt of an ID value, the tag enters its
locked state. While a tag is locked, the tag responds to all
queries with only its ID and offers no other functionality. To
unlock a tag, the owner queries the ID from the tag, looks up
the appropriate key in the back-end database and finally
transmits the key to the tag. The tag hashes the key and
compares it to the stored ID. If the values match, it unlocks
itself and offers its full functionality to any nearby readers.
It is well known that the hash-lock scheme only requires
implementing a hash function on the tag and managing keys
on the back-end. This is a relatively low-cost requirement and
may be economical in the near future. This scheme may be
extended to provide access control for multiple users or to
other tag functionality, such as write access. However, we
may need fist to check the general design idea of an approach
to RFID system.
Let's investigate an approach to protect RFID system
from user privacy to which elements in the group are
distinguishable and can be measured in bits. In general, the
design should meet the following items: (a) keep complete
user privacy (b) eliminate the need for extraneous rewrites of
the tag information (c) minimize the tag cost (d) eliminate the
need for high power of computing units (e) provide forward
security.
Following the above descriptions our proposed RFID
privacy protection scheme in this paper can be shown as
Figure 1, where H and G are one-way hash functions as used
in [19]. The reader sends ai to the back-end database. The
back-end database maintains a list of pairs (ID, si), where si is
the initial secret information and is different for each tag. So
the back-end database that received tag output ai from the
reader calculates a'i = G(f(si)) for each si in the list and
checks if ai= a'i. if it thje case a', such that a'i = ai, then
return the ID, which is a pair of a'i. The scheme satisfies the
security requirements, i.e., indistinguishability and forward
security, as follows. G is a one-way function, so if the
adversary obtains tag output ai, one cannot know si from ai.
G outputs random values, so if the adversary watches the tag
output, the attacker cannot link ai and aj,j. H is a one way
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function, so if the adversary tampers with a tag and obtains the
secret information in the tag, the attacker cannot know si from
Si+ -
From the view point of efficiency, the proposed scheme is
efficient enough to yield low-cost RFID tags, since it uses
only hash operations that require a small gate size. Therefore,
the proposed scheme is reasonable practical for low-cost
RFID tags, while still ensuring privacy even in the face of
tampering.
We assume that the adversary may eavesdrop on the radio
frequency signals between the reader and the tag. The
adversary can acquire the secret information stored in the tag
to tampering the tag. The RFID scheme should be able to
protect the user privacy against such an adversary. To ensure
the anonymity of the tag ID, obviously the tag should not
output its ID nor should output any constant data. The scheme
should meet this requirement. Moreover, this scheme offers
the properties of indistinguishability and forward security.
also be equipped with a physical contact channel, as found on
smart cards, for critical functions or for "imprinting" tags with
secret keys.
Additionally, we may assume the tag packaging contains
some optical information such as a barcode or human-readable
digits. This information may corroborate tag data, as in the
design presented in.
Tag readers are assumed to have a secure connection to a
back-end database. Although readers may only read tags from
within the short, say 3 meters, tag operating range, the reader-
to-tag, or forward channel is assumed to be broadcast with a
signal strong enough to monitor from long-range, say perhaps
100 meters. The tag-to-reader or backward channel is
relatively much weaker, and may only be monitored by
eavesdroppers within the tag's shorter operating range.
Generally, it will be assume that eavesdroppers may only
monitor the forward channel without detection. This
relationship is illustrated in Figure3.
It is noted that there are two regions from Figure 3, we
can treat those two region differently we propose that in the
secure channel we may use "instead of transmitting hash
function "bits" transmitting "codes" to make modified
protocol be "scaleable".
forward range
tMf9
4--.
0 CL2ag
X Xm
Back-end DB
Figure 1: RFID tag sends answer ai = G(s,) and renews its secret si+l = H(s) tag n
The scheme proposed in Figure 1 is a kind of "hash-
chain protocol", which has a heavy burden on back-end
database to authenticate tags since the protocol computes hash
function i times on every tag. We may find that the Figure 1
can be expressed as Figure 2.
secure channel
L.Aff ~
-------_i d
insecure channel
Figure 3: A RFID system
Query
oral 4.ifa'=athenl 2 G(s)nI
Figure 2: Protocol from Figure 1
In order to modify the Figure 2 and improve this protocol
to be scaleable, we have to have a closer look at a RFID
working concept.
Privacy concerns are rather moot if someone can remove
a tag or steal the item it is attached to without detection. The
key point is that tags cannot be trusted to store long-term
secrets, such as shared keys, when left in isolation. Tags may
The combination of Figure 2 and Figure 3 suggests that
we may take a protocol can be work as that when tag receives
a query, the answer a, = G(si) sending to reader, which is the
same case that described as that shown in Figure 2. Then
reader will code the ai in terms of H hash function but the
output is "coded" information such as CDMD, as an example
rather than "bit" information.
3 codedal
DB
decoding a
& findtheelD 4. if a =aa,tenID
respondi t/
a
1. Query
2. ai=G(si) then coded al
Figure 4: a Modified hash-chain protocol
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Then the back-end database, DB, has the list of the coded
against ID. So there is no need to calculate all "i" times to
check the if a', equal to a,. This modified hash function
protocol can be expressed as shown in Figure 4.
For a typical RFID system, the transmission rate in 13.56
MHz and 900 MHz bands available to the RFID tags is
approximately 26 kbps / 50 tags at 13.56 MHz and 128 kbps
/200 tags at 900 MHz. It was reported that a symmetric
encryption algorithm can be constructed with about 6 to 13
kilo-gates [19], so this modified hash function protocol would
be, in terms of size of gates, achieved in less than that at the
symmetric encryption algorithms.
It is noted that if the hash function has enough length bits
that will make the insecure channel close to the Gaussian
distribution. Therefore from the noise entropy, equation (9)
we have 0.51og217.1 &2 bits per message (in the binary
system).
IV. Conclusions
We have investigated the cryptographic approach to a RFID
tags detecting system. We follow the Shannon's information
theory and showed that we can directly establish a parameter
called "unlinkability" to measure the safety in a RFID
detecting system.
The Shannon's information theory can be used to explain
the quantifying information leakage well as shown in section
2.
Based on the discussion of unlinkability, we also have
made an extensibility of investigating the Shannon's
information theory, by which it is showed when the
communication channel is built with pure Gaussian noisy the
noise entropy in the communication will make the information
leakage minimum and the tag's privacy is at the safest state.
Our paper first discussed the r-ray wireless RFID
communication system and extended the results to a r-ray
RFID system. In our section three a modified hash-chain
protocol is presented based on the cryptographic approach
discussed in previous sections, where modified hash-chain
protocol will save a heavy burden on back-end database to
authenticate tags due the fact that instead of using bit
transiting a coding system is used. .
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